#1 - 2022-11-14 08:30
香饵 (光芒常在 那电灯却消失)
【1】拉图尔的科技之思 全文

【2】本雅明 | 论模仿能力 全文

【3】福柯 | 结构主义和文学分析 全文

【4】马塞洛·穆斯托: 对马克思来说，异化是理解资本主义的核心 全文

【5】刘怀玉 | 论法国尼采主义的激进现代性批判意义 全文

【6】约施克、布雷德坎普 | 从社会史到图像科学——马克思、本雅明与瓦尔堡 全文

【7】史蒂夫·皮尔 | 本雅明与弗洛伊德：现代城市里的梦游者 全文

【8】朱迪斯·巴特勒 | 论本雅明：一种时间刺穿了另一种时间 全文

【9】空间的生产与国家的世界化进程：列斐伏尔国家与空间思想研究 全文

【10】空间哲学与空间政治———福柯异托邦理论的阐释与批判 全文

【11】列斐伏尔日常生活批判的总体性方法论探析 全文

【12】亨利·列斐伏尔的整体人思想全文

【13】马克思的“总体人”及其诗性革命——基于尼采对列斐伏尔早期日常生活批判思想影响的思考全文
#2 - 2023-3-12 10:51
香饵 (光芒常在 那电灯却消失)
Amazon上看到的关于Burge的书 Perception: First Form of Mind 的评论，不说内容怎么样，感觉这种写法在书评中都难得一见

The death knell of armchair philosophy
A watershed moment in the history of philosophy. Here is one of the field's most pedantic authors, a Phil Review regular no less, a man who often cannot resist piling four adjectives on top of a single noun, basically vindicating Fodor's prophecy, from the 1960s onward, that philosophy - especially epistemology - would necessarily turn into psychology, due to the advent of the cognitive revolution, and Chomsky's work in particular. Even that old grey-beard Frege - who was massively influential precisely in separating epistemology from psychology - is brought down to earth and reinterpreted as elucidating perceptual psychology, where unconscious computational 'referential applications' (Bedeutungen) and 'characterizing attributives' (Sinne) abound. Burge's simply Herculean knowledge of the scientific literature is so overwhelming that any philosopher trying to hold on to epistemic-norm talk divorced from information processing - or 'what perception-must-be-like' independent of empirical research - is bound to feel very cowed indeed. And although Burge does not seem to realize his differences with Fodor are largely terminological - in particular, it was Fodor in 1983 who argued against MARR no less that the perceptual system has to be able to recognize poodle-shape attributives (a subject Burge lingers on here) and that such shape-based attributives ('concepts' of the perceptual module) must be systematically distinguished from concepts which figure in propositional knowledge, a point Burge likes to make ad nauseam - Burge's views here are unique enough to merit seminars devoted to Perception alone. The reason why this won't happen anytime soon is, budding philosophers would then have to ask, for whom do these bells toll? But of course, these bells toll for thee, O norm-loving philosophers.